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AGAINST (MERE) RESTYLING
Edward A. Hartnett*
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been 
completely re-
written. A top to bottom revision of every single 
rule has been com-
pleted by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. 
Both the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
and the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States have approved 
the result.2 Unless the
Supreme Court balks or the Congress intervenes, 
the bench and bar
will be using the new restyled version of the 
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in a little more than a year.
Opposition may be futile. So few seemed to 
care about the re-
write that two of the three hearings that the 
Advisory Committee
scheduled for public comment were cancelled 
due to lack of interest.
3
I have no illusion that an essay in a law review 
will awaken the bench
and the bar from their slumber-law reviews 
are more likely to put
© 2006 Edward A. Hartnett. Individuals 
and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article 
in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies 
the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this 
provision and copyright notice.
* Richard J. Hughes Professor for Constitutional and Public 
Law and Service,
Seton Hall University School of Law. The thoughts 
expressed in this Essay were
shaped by my participation in a group project to evaluate the 
proposed restyled rules
and I thank all of the participants: Janet Alexander, 
Kevin Clermont, Geoffrey
Hazard, Arthur Miller, James Pfander, David 
Shapiro, Linda Silberman, Catherine
Struve, Tobias Wolff, Gregory Joseph, Scott 
Atlaw, Allen Black, David Buchanan,
Robert Byman, Robert Ellis, Francis Fox, William 
Hangley, Loren Kieve, and Patricia
Refo. I owe special thanks to Stephen Burbank 
for inviting me to join the project and
for his comments on an earlier draft. It bears 
emphasis that I do not speak for the
group, but only for myself.
I ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL
RULES ADVISORY COMMirIEE (2006) [hereinafter 2006 RESTYLED 
RULESi, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Appendix-D.pdf.
2 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 25 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www .u...../p
ST09-2006.pdf; Judicial Conference Action: 
September 2006 Session, http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/#judicia090 6 (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
3 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 21.
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readers to sleep. Nevertheless, this Essay argues that the restyled rules
should not be approved.
My opposition does not stem from a preference for the word
"averment" over the word "allegation." And I have no objection to
sentences that begin with a conjunction. I do not extol the beauty of
sentences that are long with many separate dependent clauses branch-
ing off in tangential directions requiring great skill to determine what
refers to what rather than short, simple, crisp, direct sentences. I like
short sentences.
As have other procedural reformers before them, the restylists
seek to make procedural rules simpler, clearer, more accessible, and
easier to understand. I certainly share these goals. My job includes
trying to help students who were not yet born when the Rules Ena-
bling Act celebrated its fiftieth birthday learn the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. I'm not looking to make that job any harder.
Yet the restylists have set themselves a goal that is at once insuffi-
ciently ambitious and overly difficult. Unlike prior reformers, they do
not seek to create a better procedure. Unlike those who brought us
the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they do not seek to su-
persede preexisting statutory procedures. To the contrary, the
restylists attempt to completely rewrite the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure while leaving the law of procedure the same as it was before
their reform.
Part I of this Essay illustrates the near-impossibility of this task
with some examples drawn from the changes made to the proposed
restyled rules in response to public comment. Part I argues that the
goal of preserving existing meaning is at war with the goal of clarity
and simplicity. Moreover, rather than confront this dilemma head on,
the proposed restyled rules add an additional layer of ambiguity, and
do so in a way that brings to the fore the interpretive battle that rages
between those who follow the plain meaning of the text and those
who seek the lawmakers' purpose in legislative history. Part III ad-
dresses the possible supersession problems raised by the proposed
restyled rules, and observes that the solution to the supersession
problems attempted by the proposed restyled rules rests on a view of
supersession that is almost certainly wrong.
I. THE NEAR-IMPOSSIBILITY OF CHANGING TEXT WITHOUT
CHANGING MEANING
Two years ago, Professor Edward Cooper, the reporter for the
Advisory Committee, used the pages of this journal to urge "the bench
and bar [to] make the effort to examine the restyled rules with punc-
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tilious care."'4 He observed that it "may be too much to ask any one
person to assume this responsibility for every rule," but suggested that
readers pick a "favorite rule or two," plus another "rule or a few to
examine out of idle curiosity."5
Professor Stephen Burbank and Gregory Joseph heeded this call.
Agreeing that the task was too great for a single person, but less trust-
ing of serendipity than Professor Cooper, they organized a group of
twenty-one and divided the proposed restyled rules (which had been
released for public comment in February of 2005)6 among the mem-
bers of the group. Each rule was examined by at least one academic
and one practicing lawyer, working as a team. I was assigned, along
with Allen Black, to Rules 64 through 71. (I don't claim that these are
my favorite rules; I was too slow to respond to the invitation to get first
dibs.)
On my first few passes, making the "[s]ide-by-side reading and
comparison '7 between the existing rule and the proposed restyled
rule that Professor Cooper had encouraged, I was impressed. The
restyled rules are clearer and easier to understand. Yet as I dug fur-
ther, moving beyond comparison of two texts to an examination of
judicial interpretations of the current rule and asking whether the
restyled rule might change that interpretation, I became more and
more concerned. The more I looked, the less sanguine I became. By
the time I concluded my review, I decided that I could not support the
adoption of the restyled rules.
A majority of the assembled group reached the same conclusion.
The detailed report noted concerns of one sort or another with most
rules. I will not attempt to reproduce that report here, but focus in-
stead on the few rules on which I worked. Even as to those rules, I will
not discuss all of the numerous instances where I believe that the
restyled rules arguably deviate from the meaning of the current rules.
Instead, I will discuss first only those instances (and not even all of
those) in which the Advisory Committee found the critique of their
February 2005 restyled rules sufficiently well taken to make changes in
the restyled rules before recommending them to the Standing Coin-
4 Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1761, 1785 (2004).
5 Id. at 1785-86.
6 COMM. ON RULES OF PRAcTiCE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (2005) [hereinafter 2005 DRAFr RULES], available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/Prelimdraft proposed-ptl .pdf.
7 Cooper, supra note 4, at 1785.
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mittee. The five areas discussed below, I believe, serve well to illus-
trate the difficulty of restyling a rule without changing its meaning.
A. Five Examples
1. Rule 65(a)
Consider Rule 65(a), which governs preliminary injunctions.
The current rule states, "Before or after the commencement of the
hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may
order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consoli-
dated with the hearing of the application."" The February 2005 pro-
posed restyled rule stated, "Before or after beginning a hearing on a
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial
on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing."9
The proposed rule referred to "a hearing" rather than "the hear-
ing." Yet the reference in the current rule to "the hearing" is some-
times thought to imply that a hearing on an application for a
preliminary injunction is required.' The proposed change from "the
hearing" to "a hearing" would have made the inference that a hearing
is required somewhat less likely. And the Advisory Committee
changed it back, so that the restyled rule approved by the Judicial
Conference now reads, "Before or after beginning the hearing on a
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial
on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing.""
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (emphasis added).
9 2005 D.AFr RULES, supra note 6, at 167 (emphasis added).
10 See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In this
circuit, the refusal to hear oral testimony... is not an abuse of discretion if the parties
have a full opportunity to submit written testimony and to argue the matter."); Aoude
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 893-94 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that courts normally
"look askance" at the lack of an evidentiary hearing or oral argument, but adopting a
pragmatic approach); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 163 (3d Cir.
1982) (saying a hearing is "salutary or at least expedient," but not required if submit-
ted evidence does not present unresolved relevant factual issue); see 11A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcricE AND PROCEDURE § 2947, at 126 (2d ed. 1995)
("Some type of a hearing also implicitly is required by subdivision (a) (2) .... "); id.
§ 2951, at 253 (noting that a temporary restraining order "is designed to preserve the
status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a
preliminary injunction"); cf. id. § 2949, at 225-31 (discussing the views of various
courts as to when hearings are required).
11 2006 RESTYLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-172 (emphasis added).
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2. Rule 65(b)
Current Rule 65 (b) provides, "A temporary restraining order may
be granted without written or oral notice to 
the adverse party or that
party's attorney only if .... ,,1 The February 
2005 proposed restyling
stated, "The court may issue a temporary restraining 
order without
notice to the adverse party or its attorney 
only if . . " 3 A 1966
amendment had been designed to "make it plain 
that informal notice,
which may be communicated to the attorney 
rather than the adverse
party, is to be preferred to no notice at all."
1 4 By changing "without
written or oral notice" to "without notice," 
this point may have been
obscured. In particular, some might have contended 
that the notice
referred to in the proposed rule contemplates 
service pursuant to
Rules 4, 4.1, or 5, rather than a telephone call 
to the attorney, who
might be far more readily available than the party. 
The Advisory Com-
mittee restored the words "written or oral," 
and they are in the pro-
posed restyled rule as approved by the Judicial 
Conference.'3
3. Rule 65(c)
Rule 65(c) was of particular concern. It currently provides, 
"No
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except 
upon
the giving of security by the applicant, in such 
sum as the court deems
proper, for the payment of such costs and 
damages as may be in-
curred or suffered by any party who is found 
to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained."16 Although the current rule can 
be read as
mandating that security be given whenever a 
restraining order or pre-
liminary injunction is issued, courts have frequently concluded 
that
they have discretion to waive the posting of 
security.17 The word
12 FED. R. Crx. P. 65(b) (emphasis added).
13 2005 DRAFT RULES, supra note 6, at 167.
14 FED. R. Cix. P. 65 advisory committee's note 
(1966); see HlA WPGHT ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 2941, at 36-37 (noting that the amendment 
was prompted "because
it was felt that the original wording of the rule 
could be misinterpreted to permit a
party seeking a restraining order to refrain 
from giving informal notice when the
circumstances did not allow formal notice and 
a hearing"); id. § 2951, at 263-64 (not-
ing that the Advisory Committee was concerned 
about possible due process defects in
ex parte proceedings); id. § 2952, at 273-74 (describing 
the "informal notice require-
ment" as "consistent with notions of fair play 
and the general spirit of the federal
rules," as well as the possibility of "constitutional 
dimension").
15 2006 RES-T-YLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-172.
16 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (emphasis added).
17 See, e.g., Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern 
Pipeline Co., 825 F.2d 1461, 1462
(10th Cir. 1987) (noting that, in some circumstances, a 
trial court may "determine a
bond is unnecessary," but that the court must 
at least consider whether to require a
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"shall," as Professor Cooper has noted, "has imperative overtones, but
often preserves some measure of discretion," and that even where the
original intent was otherwise, "[a] ctual practice may have added some
measure of discretion."' 8 Waiver of the bond requirement is common
in public interest litigation and cases brought by indigents. The lead-
ing case states bluntly, "It is clear to us that indigents, suing individu-
ally or as class plaintiffs, ordinarily should not be required to post a
bond under Rule 65(c)." 19
The February 2005 proposed rule stated, "If the court issues a
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, the court
must require the movant to give security in an amount that the court
considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party
found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained."20 The change
from "[n] o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue ex-
cept upon the giving of security," to "the court must require the mo-
vant to give security," would appear to have removed the discretion
that the word "shall," at least in practice, left available. Such a change
would have been quite significant in cases where the movant lacks the
resources to post security.
The Advisory Committee again altered the proposed restyled
rules in response. Rather than restore the word "shall"-a word the
restylists treat with such abhorrence that perhaps it should be added
bond); see IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2954, at 292-93 ("[lit has been held
that the court may dispense with security altogether if the grant of an injunction car-
ries no risk of monetary loss to the defendant."); cf Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665,
675 (2d Cir. 1961) (relying on phrase "as the court deems proper" to permit court to
find that no bond is required).
18 Cooper, supra note 4, at 1777.
19 Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see Wayne Chem.,
Inc., v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
the "bond may be excused, notwithstanding the literal language" of the rule, where
the plaintiff is indigent); Brown v. Callahan, 979 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D. Kan. 1997)
(following Bass); llA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2954, at 298 (describing Bass as
"correct" and "followed by other courts"). For other examples, see Pharm. Soc'y of
N.Y. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 50 F.3d 1168, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that district court properly waived the bond requirement because litigation pursued
.public interests"); Cal. ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d
1319, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding discretion to dispense with the security re-
quirement when plaintiff cannot afford bond, particularly where Congress has pro-
vided for private enforcement of a statute). For academic treatment, see 13 JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.52, at 65-97 to 65-98 (3d ed.
2006) (noting circumstances in which court "may waive security"); 1 A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 2954, at 300-03 (discussing approvingly cases that relax the bond
requirement in public interest litigation).
20 2005 DRAfr RuLES, supra note 6, at 168 (emphasis added).
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to Rule 7(c) as a banned word in federal civil procedure2 1-it restruc-
tured the sentence completely to avoid using either "shall" or "must."
The proposal is now, "The court may issue a preliminary injunction or
a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an
amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages
sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained" 22
4. Rule 65(d)
Rule 65(d) reveals not only the difficulty of restyling a rule with-
out changing its meaning, but also how even very minor changes can
have a significant impact. The current Rule 65(d) provides, "Every
order granting an injunction ... is binding only upon the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them
who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or other-
wise."2 3 This text is ambiguous regarding whether the notice require-
ment modifies the entire list of persons who might be bound by an
injunction or restraining order or modifies only "those persons in ac-
tive concert or participation." Most sensibly conclude that the notice
requirement applies to all,2 4 so that even a party is not bound by an
21 See 2006 REsTvLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-8 ("The restyled rules minimize
the use of inherently ambiguous words. For example, the word 'shall' can mean
,must,' 'may,' or something else, depending on context. The potential for confusion
is exacerbated by the fact that 'shall' is no longer generally used in spoken or clearly
written English. The restyled rules replace 'shall' with 'must,' 'may,' or 'should,' de-
pending on which one the context and established interpretation make correct in
each rule."); cf, e.g., Exodus 20:13 (New American Bible) ("You shall not kill.").
Actually, given the restylers' plan to delete the abolition of demurrers from Rule
7(c), perhaps "shall" should replace demurrers as an abolished term. Thus Rule 7(c)
would read, "Shall Abolished. Shall shall not be used." Or should that be "Shall Abol-
ished. Shall must not be used."?
22 2006 RESTYLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-173 (emphasis added).
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
24 See MooRE ET AL., supra note 19, § 65.6113], at 65-108 ("A party ... or non-
party .. .who has not received 'actual notice' of an injunction or restraining order
will not be bound by its terms."); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2956, at 337
("Another prerequisite for binding a person to an injunction is that the person must
have notice of the order."); id. at 351-52 ("Of course ... an officer or agent must
have notice of the injunction to be held in contempt for acting in concert with the
corporation."); id. § 2960, at 381 (stating that contempt requires finding that "party
to be charged had notice of the order").
2oo61
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injunction or restraining order until he receives notice, but 
not all
courts agree.
25
The February 2005 proposed rule, however, created 
subdivisions
in Rule 65(d)(2), and placed the notice requirement 
in subsection
(d) (2) (C), thereby limiting its application to those described 
in sub-
section (d) (2) (C). It provided:
The order binds only the following:
(A) the parties;
(B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys;
and
(C) other persons who receive actual notice of the order 
by per-
sonal service or otherwise and who are in active 
concert or partici-
pation with anyone described in Rule 
65(d) (2) (A) or (B) .26
By its terms, then, that proposed rule would have held 
parties,
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys 
bound to an in-
junction or restraining order-and thereby subject to punishment 
for
contempt-even when they lacked notice 
of the injunction or re-
straining order.
In response to this concern, the Advisory Committee 
concluded
that the current rule was based on former 
28 U.S.C. § 363, but that
the original rulemakers had omitted a comma 
contained in the stat-
ute.27 Resolving to restore the meaning of the 
earlier statute, the Ad-
visory Committee moved the phrase requiring 
notice so that it applies
to all. As approved by the Judicial Conference, 
the proposed restyled
rule now reads:
The order binds only the following who receive actual 
notice of it by
personal service or otherwise:
(A) the parties;
(B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys;
and
(C) other persons who are in active concert or participation 
with
anyone described in Rule 65(d) (2) (A) 
or (B). 28
25 Dole Fresh Fruit Co. v. United Banana 
Co., 821 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting the ambiguity and concluding that officers 
and agents, servants, employees
and attorneys need not receive actual notice 
of the injunction, but vacating the con-
tempt order on other grounds).
26 2005 DRAFT RULES, supra note 6, at 
169.
27 2006 RESTvLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-174.
28 Id.
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5. Rule 68
Rule 68 currently provides, "At any time more than 10 days
before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment ... "29 The Febru-
ary 2005 proposed restyled rule stated, "At least 10 days before the
trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party
an offer to allow judgment . . . ."0
The existing rule requires the offer to be made more than ten
days before trial; the proposed rule would have required the offer to
be made at least ten days before trial. The proposed rule, unlike the
current rule, would have permitted an offer to be made exactly ten
days before trial. In short, x > 10is not the same as x > 10. Moreover,
the existing rule measures the ten days explicitly from the day the trial
"begins," or, in the case of an offer after the determination of liability,
from the "commencement" of the hearing. By deleting these terms,
the proposed rule might have increased ambiguity.3'
In response, the Advisory Committee revised the proposed rule to
read, "More than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow
judgment .... "32
All five of these examples involved quite modest textual
differences:
(1) "the" as opposed to "a"
(2) "written or oral" to modify "notice" as opposed to no such
modifier
(3) "shall" as opposed to "must" as opposed to "may ... only if"
(4) a comma as opposed to no comma
(5) "more" as opposed to "at least"
Yet they carried with them the potential for rather significant
changes:
(1) whether there is a hearing on an application for a preliminary
injunction
(2) whether a party or counsel is notified before an application for a
TRO
(3) whether an injunction can realistically be obtained by an
indigent
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
30 2005 DR-r RULES, supra note 6, at 173.
31 See Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D.R.I. 1980) (concluding that
a trial begins for the purpose of Rule 68 "when the trial judge calls the proceedings to
order and actually commences to hear the case," not with jury selection).
32 2006 RESTYLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-178.
2oo61
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(4) whether someone needs notice of an injunction before being
held in contempt
(5) whether an offer of judgment is timely
That such modest textual changes carry such 
significant effect un-
derscores the near-impossibility of making 
significant textual changes
without changing meaning. Tellingly, 
the Advisory Committee's re-
search undertaken in response to concerns 
with Rule 65(d) reveals
that the original Advisory Committee inadvertently 
omitted a comma
when adapting statutory language for inclusion 
in the Federal Rules.
Thus even the original Advisory Committee, 
led by Dean Clark, stum-
bled when attempting to take an existing 
law and reproduce it in a
different form. Moreover, this omission of 
a comma was of little sig-
nificance in an ambiguous rule because most 
courts and commenta-
tors resolved the ambiguity in a sensible 
way. An attempt to make
things clear, however, led to a proposal that 
people be subject to pun-
ishment for contempt for violating an injunction despite 
lack of no-
tice of that injunction.
B. Beyond These Five Examples
Some might say that surely any significant 
changes that would
have been made by the restyled rules have 
been found by now, given
the painstaking processes of the Advisory 
Committee, including its
careful response to public comment. There 
is no doubt that the Advi-
sory Committee has worked with care and 
dedication. I certainly ap-
preciate the care and dedication with 
which they responded to
submitted comments.
Indeed, some may find it ungracious of me 
to continue opposi-
tion, considering the seriousness with which 
the Advisory Committee
responded to my concerns. But the Advisory 
Committee has not
cleared up all of the ways the proposed restyled 
rules might change
the meaning of the existing rules. Consider 
the Rule 65(c) issue dis-
cussed above regarding the giving of security 
upon issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction. The current rule uses the word "shall," 
while the
February 2005 proposed rule stated that the 
court "must" require the
movant to give security. The rule as approved 
by the Judicial Confer-
ence states that a court may issue a preliminary 
injunction "only if' the
movant gives security. I'm not confident 
that "only if" gives the same
measure of discretion as "shall," or that 
it removes discretion to the
same extent as "must" would. Is anyone?
Moreover, I don't have the chutzpah to claim 
that I caught every-
thing the Advisory Committee missed. 
If the Advisory Committee's
distinguished members, advisors, consultants, 
and reporter missed
AGAINST (MERE) RESTYLING
things that I caught, I have to believe that others will catch things that
we all missed.
All of us involved in the process so far have been attempting to
imagine possible problems in hypothetical cases. If the restyled rules
go into effect, however, many other minds will be brought to bear,
and those minds will include thousands of lawyers dealing with con-
crete problems presented in particular cases. Moreover, those lawyers
will be working zealously to advocate for a client whose interests are
affected. Surely they will be able to find other instances where the
restyled rule departs from the meaning of the current rule. At the
very least, they will be able to discover and make plausible arguments
that the new rule does not mean the same thing as the old rule did.
Thus far, I have only discussed proposed restyled rules that the
Advisory Committee changed in response to public comment. As I
noted at the outset, I believe that these five examples serve well to
illustrate the difficulty of restyling a rule without changing its mean-
ing. But I don't want to give the impression that the only difficulties
with the proposed restyled rules were relatively straightforward
problems that, once identified, were relatively easy to fix. Therefore, I
will discuss an example of less obvious concerns about aspects of a
single restyled rule-aspects that were not altered by the Advisory
Committee in response to comments, presumably because they are
less amenable to fixing.
Current Rule 68 provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party de-
fending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to
allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the
money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs
then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the
adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either
party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter
judgment.33
The proposed restyled version of Rule 68(a), as approved by the
Judicial Conference, provides:
More than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against
a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment
on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 10 days
after being served, the opposing party serves written notice ac-
cepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter
judgment.34
It is unclear under the current rule whether an offer can be con-
ditioned on the acceptance of all plaintiffs. 3 5 The proposed change
from 'judgment ... for the money or property or to the effect speci-
fied in the offer" to 'judgment on specified terms" would make it
more difficult to contend that an offer cannot be conditioned on ac-
ceptance by all plaintiffs.
There is also some question whether the existing rule applies to
actions for equitable relief.36 The proposed change from 'judg-
ment.., for the money or property or to the effect specified in the
offer" to 'Judgment on specified terms" would make it more difficult
to contend that the rule does not apply to offers to accept a particular
equitable decree. There is a similar dispute whether the existing rule
applies to class actions.3
7
If Rule 68 applies to equitable relief and class actions, the court
under the current rule retains authority to reject an accepted offer.z8
34 2006 REsTLEt) RULES, supra note 1, at D-178.
35 See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 958 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding it
permissible for a defendant to impose such a condition, but leaving open the ques-
tion whether it is effectual to shift costs to plaintiffs who signified their desire to ac-
cept the offer); MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, § 68.04[9], at 68-34 (describing this as
the "most problematic multiple-party situation").
36 See Chathas v. Local 134 IBEW, 233 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Rule 68
offers are much more common in money cases than in equity cases, but nothing in
the rule forbids its use in the latter type of case."); 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 3001.1, at 79 (2d ed. 1997) (noting suggestions that the rule does not apply in
actions for equitable relief, but rejecting those suggestions).
37 See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 344 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica,
C.J.) ("Courts have wrestled with the application of Rule 68 in the class action con-
text, noting Rule 68 offers to individual named plaintiffs undercut close court supervi-
sion of class action settlements, create conflicts of interests for named plaintiffs, and
encourage premature class certification motions."); Schaake v. Risk Mgmt. Alterna-
tives, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[11t has long been recognized that
Rule 68 Offers of Judgment have no applicability to matters legitimately brought as
class actions pursuant to Rule 23."); MooRE ET AL., supra note 19, § 68.03[31, at 68-15
(noting "conflict in the few decisions addressing whether Rule 68 should apply to
class actions" and stating that it is "questionable whether the offer of judgment rule
should apply to cases such as class or derivative actions that require judicial approval
of a settlement"); Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 337, 363, 367 (1983) (proposing an amendment to
make clear that the rule does not apply to class or derivative actions).
38 See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3005, at 109-10 (asserting that while
Rule 68 offers "may include provision for a specified injunctive regime," the "court
cannot be compelled to enter the agreed judgment even though it emerged from a
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The proposed rule, however, by changing "the clerk shall enter judg-
ment" to "[tihe clerk must then enter judgment," makes it more diffi-
cult to interpret the rule to permit such discretion.
These concerns are related: one way in which the current rule
can be accommodated to equitable relief and class actions is through
the availability of discretion to decline to enter an agreed judgment or
decree. The proposed rule, on the one hand, strengthens arguments
that it applies to equitable relief, while weakening arguments for dis-
cretion to decline to enter agreed judgments. If Rule 68 applies to
class actions, and the duty of the clerk to enter judgment is made
mandatory, settling parties can use Rule 68 offers to evade the stric-
tures of Rule 23.
This is one illustration of the kind of plausible arguments that
conscientious lawyers can and should make if the restyled rules go
into effect.
II. TEXT, PURPOSE, AND RESrvLING
An obvious response to the risk that the restyled rules might
change the meaning of the existing rules is to emphasize that such
change is not intended. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1
states, "The style changes to the rules are intended to make no
changes in substantive meaning."39 Moreover, after each rule, the Ad-
visory Committee Note intones, "The language of Rule - has been
amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make
them more easily understood and to make style and terminology con-
sistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylis-
tic only."40
There is, of course, no assurance that courts will heed this monot-
onous note rather than attend to the plain language of the restyled
rules. If the Advisory Committee were more committed to avoiding
the risk that the restyled rules will be interpreted to mean something
different than the existing rules, it could have included a rule of con-
struction in the text of the rules themselves.
Rules of construction are hardly unheard of in the Federal Rules.
Rule 1 provides that the rules "shall be construed and administered to
Rule 68 offer and acceptance" and that "Rule 68 cannot remove th(e] authority and
duty" of a court to determine whether the settlement of a class action is acceptable);
see also Acceptance Indem. Ins, Co. v. Se. Forge, 209 F.R.D. 697, 698 n.2 (M.D. Ga.
2002) (concluding that, in light of Rule 54, an accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment
that does not include all claims and all parties does not result in a final judgment).
39 2006 RESlYLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-8.
40 See, e.g., id. at 20 (Rule 4.1); id. at 54 (Rule 16); id. at 169 (Rule 62).
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secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion. ' '4 Rule 82 provides that the rules "shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or
the venue of actions therein."42 The Advisory Committee could have
included a proposed addition to Rule 1 that stated, "These rules must
be construed to retain the same meaning after the amendments
adopted on December 1, 2007, as they did before those amendments."
Alternatively, it could have proposed an addition to Rule 82 that
stated, "The amendments adopted on December 1, 2007, must not be
construed to change the meaning of the rules as they existed before
that date."
Such a mandatory rule of construction would provide solid
ground on which to rely for the conclusion that the restyled rules
would not change the meaning of the existing rules. But it would do
so at the cost of making it impossible for anyone to rely on the text of
any of the restyled rules. In every instance in which someone relied
on the text of the restyled rule, it would be open for others to argue
that the text of the rule should be ignored in favor of its prior mean-
ing. Rather than remove ambiguities and divisions of authority, it
would retain them. The seeming clarity of the restyled rules would
never be achieved. Rather than being simpler, clearer, more accessi-
ble, and easier to understand, all of the difficulties of the existing
rules would be carried forward.
Thus the Advisory Committee had a very good reason not to pro-
pose such a rule of construction: it would undermine the very goals of
restyling itself.43
Yet by omitting such a rule of construction while including an
Advisory Committee Note that the amendments "are intended to be
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
42 FED. R. Crv. P. 82; see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."); id. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."); 1 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (providing that, unless the
context indicates otherwise, singular includes the plural, masculine includes the femi-
nine, and "person" includes corporations); 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-1 (f) ("Each provision
of this part and each provision of a compact or funding agreement shall be liberally
construed for the benefit of the Indian tribe participating in self-governance and any
ambiguity shall be resolved in favor of the Indian tribe.").
43 Cf Cooper, supra note 4, at 1767 ("The Style Project would be a disaster if-
against all odds-it actually should succeed in freezing the 'present meaning' of every
rule.").
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stylistic only,"44 the proposed restyling rules give ammunition to both
those who rely on plain text and those who rely on the lawmakers'
purpose. Some lawyers in some cases will rely on the plain language
of the restyled rule while their adversary relies on the purpose of
maintaining the pre-existing meaning. Some courts will accept the
former, others will accept the latter; still others will blend the two.45
The more that courts rely on the purpose of maintaining prior
meaning, the less the restyled rules will achieve their goal of making
the rules clear and easily understood. The flip side is that the more
that courts rely on the plain language of the restyled rule, the more
the restyled rules will achieve their goal of making the rules clear and
44 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1076-85 (1993) (noting that while some
cases suggest an affinity for plain meaning, the Supreme Court continues to use other
canons of construction, such as legislative history and the other policies behind the
rules); Adam N. Steinman, "Less" is "More"? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solu-
tion to the Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IowA L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2007) (manuscript at 4), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=920692
(discussing the textualist and intentionalist divide among federal appellate judges re-
garding the requirement that an application for discretionary appellate review of re-
moval under CAFA must be made "not less than 7 days after entry of the order"
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (1) (West Supp. 2005))). See generallyJaREMY WALDRON,
THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 25-28 (1999); Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The
Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprdence, the
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision
of the Rules, 60 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 857, 865-68 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 626-40 (1990) (discussing the role of congres-
sional intent in statutory interpretation and how courts use various sources to identify
that intent).
Some think that the textualists have sufficiently won the battle that there is not
much difference these days between textualist judges and purposivist judges.
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (2006)
("Conventional wisdom has it that the textualists emphasize statutory text and
purposivists emphasize statutory purposes. But when one considers how modern tex-
tualists go about identifying textual meaning and how purposivists go about identify-
ing statutory purposes, the differences between textualism and purposivism begin to
fade."); id. at 5 (claiming that the "battle is largely over"); see also Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617-22 (2005) (applying a textualist analy-
sis to conclude (basically) that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving an insufficient amount in
controversy, and a purposive analysis to conclude that it does not do so as to claims
involving lack of diverse citizenship); cf John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. Rev. 70, 75 (2006) (agreeing that there is "more concep-
tual common ground than textualists ... have sometimes emphasized" but arguing
that textualists are concerned with semantic context and purposivists are concerned
with policy context).
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easily understood.46 Ironically, then, the best 
hope for the successful
implementation of clear, easily understood restyled 
rules is if lawyers
and judges ignore the Advisory Committee Note repeated after 
each
restyled rule. Indeed, this is not all that different 
from the expressed
hope that lawyers and judges may forget that there ever was a restyling
project.47
And what would be wrong with that? Isn't any 
attempt to cling to
the meaning of the rules as they exist today 
like trying to command
the tides to cease? No set of procedural rules 
is perfect, and no draft-
ing exercise is either. Why not say that careful, 
knowledgeable, and
diligent people have worked for years to produce 
the restyled rules,
that the restyled rules are as good as humanly possible, 
and their plain
language should be allowed to supplant the 
meaning of the current
rules?
The problem is that the proposed restyled rules 
have only been
generated and evaluated from the perspective 
of determining whether
or not they reproduce current meaning. Neither 
the Advisory Com-
mittee, the Standing Committee, nor the Judicial 
Conference evalu-
ated them from the perspective of determining 
whether or not they
are good rules of civil procedure.
Rule 62 (d) illustrates the point. In producing the February 
2005
proposed restyled version of Rule 62(d) (2), the Advisory 
Committee
took great care to produce what it took to be 
the meaning of existing
Rule 62(d). It followed the punctuation of the existing 
rule pre-
cisely-perhaps too precisely-and limited 
the requirement of notice
to those who are in active concert with the parties 
and their agents. If
anyone involved in the restyling had looked 
at the rule they were pro-
ducing and asked, not whether it replicated 
the existing rule, but
whether it was a good rule, it is difficult to imagine 
that they would
have produced a rule that called for people 
to be bound by injunc-
tions they didn't know about. But that wasn't 
the question for the
restyling project.
If there is any significant possibility that the 
meaning of the ex-
isting rules will be lost as lawyers and judges focus only on 
the text of
46 The tension bubbles to the surface in the 
Advisory Committee's Notes to pro-
posed Rule 65(d). There, the Advisory Committee's 
Notes include not only the stan-
dard claim that the changes are merely stylistic, 
but also a statement that the changes
restore the meaning of a statute that was imperfectly 
expressed in the original 1938
rules. See 2006 RESTvLED RULES, supra note 
1, at D-174.
47 See id. at D-5 ("The best sign of our success may 
be that in a few years, the
bench and bar will have forgotten that there 
ever was a Style Project.").
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the restyled rules-and there is411-then the time to ask that question
is before the proposed restyled rules are put into effect.
III. TEXT, PURPOSE, AND SUPERSESSION
The Rules Enabling Act not only empowers the Supreme Court to
"prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evi-
dence for cases in the United States district courts (including pro-
ceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals,"49 it
also provides that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. '50 Under the
supersession clause of the Rules Enabling Act, then, a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure can displace a pre-existing Act of Congress. Of
course, a subsequent Act of Congress can displace a pre-existing Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure.
In other words, under the current statutory framework, Congress
and the Supreme Court each have the power to displace the procedu-
ral rules established by the other for the federal courts. 51
In some instances, notably the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act, Congress has rather clearly established procedural require-
ments at variance with the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 2
48 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 1783 ("As time passes, memory of the Style Project
will fade. New meaning will be found without any awareness of the earlier language
or meaning. In part that will be a good thing: substantive changes will be made be-
cause the new meaning is better than perpetuating the old. We cannot effectively
prevent that process, and we may not wish to."); cf. Ric-iRp, H. FALLONJR., DANIELJ.
METZLER & DAVID L. SHPIRo, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 908 (5th ed. 2003) (describing how federal officer removal was ex-
panded by the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code); Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Varia-
tions on a Jurisdictional Scheme, 41 STAN. L. REv. 469, 514 (1989) (criticizing the
Commission on Revision and Consolidation of the Statutes of the United States for
eliminating "the important provision for postjudgment removal"); Edward Hartnett,
A New Trick From an Old and Abused Dog: Section 14 4 1(c) Lives and Now Permits the Re-
mand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FoRD-taM L. REv. 1099, 1129-31 (1995) (describing
the changes made to separable claim removal by the 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code).
49 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000).
50 Id. § 2072(b).
51 Three caveats: 1) any Rule promulgated by the Supreme Court under the
Rules Enabling Act must also comport with the substantive rights limitation of that
Act, see id. ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.");
2) Congress retains the power to repeal the Rules Enabling Act, in whole or in part;
and 3) both Federal Rules and Acts of Congress must comply with the Constitution.
52 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000) (requiring a complaint to "specify
each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the state-
ment is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made
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In other instances, courts have interpreted Acts of Congress to either
supersede the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to influ-
ence their interpretation. For example, some courts that have permit-
ted injunctions without security under Rule 65(c) have done so in
reliance on the particular statute being enforced. 53 Similarly, some
courts have viewed the mandatory requirement of current Rule 68
that "the offeree must pay the costs" to be "overridden by a contrary
statutory provision."54
on information and belief, (to] state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed"); id. § 78u-4(b) (2) (requiring a complaint to "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind"); Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[F]or pri-
vate securities fraud suits Congress altered the consequences of a Rule 11(b)
violation .... ).
53 See Cal. ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1319,
1325-26 (9th Cir. 1985) (exercising discretion to dispense with the security require-
ment when plaintiff cannot afford bond, particularly where Congress has provided for
private enforcement of a statute); Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 491 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) ("If any difference exists between the language of Rule 65(c) and Congres-
sional intent clearly embodied in the remedial statutes at issue, the federal statutes
control."); llA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2954, at 302 (using this quotation
from the Bass case to summarize the "thrust of the argument for a court exercising its
discretion under Rule 65(c) in a permissive fashion"); see also id. § 2954, at 300 (not-
ing that waiving the security requirement for the indigent "is consistent with the pur-
poses of actions permitted in forma pauperis").
54 13 Moo, ET-AL., supra note 19, § 68.08[1l], at 68-54; see N.C. Shellfish Growers
Ass'n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 666-69 (E.D.N.C. 2003); R.N. v.
Suffield Bd. of Educ., 194 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. Conn. 2000) (relying on a statute that
invokes Rule 68, but includes an exception).
There are conflicting decisions whether a Rule 68 offer to provide a plaintiff with
the maximum he could recover individually moots a proposed class action. MooR ET
AL., supra note 19, § 68.03[3], at 68-15 to 68-98 ; 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 3001.1, at 3 (Supp. 2006); see Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 348 (3d Cir.
2004) ("Absent undue delay in filing a motion for class certification ...where a
defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to an individual claim that has the effect of mooting
possible class relief asserted in the complaint, the appropriate course is to relate the
certification motion back to the filing of the class complaint."); Schaake v. Risk Mgmt.
Alternatives, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that to permit such a
tactic would "allow defendants to essentially opt-out of Rule 23"). One basis for con-
cluding that such an offer does not moot the class action has been that the statute
being enforced contemplated class actions. Weiss, 385 F.3d at 345 (stating that a "sig-
nificant consideration" is that "Congress explicitly provided for class damages" and
intended that the statute be enforced "by private attorney generals," and concluding
that "[riepresentative actions . . . appear to be fundamental to the statutory
structure").
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The February 2005 proposed restyled rules said nothing about
supersession. There was a substantial risk that upon taking effect, the
restyled rules would supersede "all laws in conflict with" them.
In analyzing the relationship between a statute and a rule
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Couz't of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted a straightforward last-in-time
rule: in 1997, it concluded that the 1996 amendments to the informa
pauperis statute superseded then-existing Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a). 5 In 1998, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a) was amended, and in 1999, the court held that the amended
Rule 24(a) rule superseded the in forma pauperis statute.5 6 It did not
matter to the Court of Appeals that Rule 24(a) had been amended in
1998 as part of the restyling of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure-or that the meaning of Rule 24(a) was the same after 1998 as it
had been before the 1996 amendments to the informa pauperis statute.
The key issue was which of two conflicting rules was last in time.
Other courts adopt a different approach, looking to the purpose
of the rule amendment in order to determine supersession. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that a 1979 amend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure did not supersede a
1978 statute, relying on an Advisory Committee Note to conclude that
the purpose of the 1979 amendment was "'clarity only.'- 57
The Advisory Committee not only favors the latter approach but
evidently believes that the "supersession is determined by looking to
the nature and purpose of the amendment and comparing the date of
55 Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 1997). The court found a
conflict that overcame the maxim that repeals by implication are not favored. Id. at
277-78; cf Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 201 & n.16 (1997). The court in Baugh
concluded that the 1996 statute did not conflict with the relevant provision of Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 because the 1996 statute "merely moved" the provi-
sion from one subsection to another. Id. at 201. Such relocation was not viewed as
"evidence of congressional intent to abrogate procedures in Rule 24," and there was
"no hint of such intent in the legislative history." Id. at 201 n.16. For a critique of the
use of the canon against repeals by implication in the context of clashes between
statutes and Federal Rules, see Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied
Repeals Analysis: A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and
Federal Rules, 51 EMORY LJ. 677 (2002).
56 Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803-04 (6th Cir. 1999). Callihan cannot
be understood as simply an effort to undermine Floyd: both Foyd and Callihan were
written by Chief Judge Martin.
57 Autoskill Inc. v. Nat'l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1485 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1993) (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1979)); see also
Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Custom Air Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d
345, 348 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (following Autoskill and describing the 1979 amendment
as involving "minor revisions").
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the statute with the date the particular substantive 
rule provision that
is inconsistent with that statute first 'took 
effect." 5 8 Rather than rely-
ing solely on an Advisory Committee Note (as it did with 
the possibil-
ity that the restyled rules might change 
the meaning of the existing
rules), the Advisory Committee added a proposed Rule 
86(b) to deal
with the risk of supersession:
If any provision in Rules 1-5.1, 6-73, or 77-86 conflicts 
with another
law, priority in time for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b) is not
affected by the amendments taking 
effect on December 1, 2007.
59
It also added a Committee Note stating:
Any conflict that arises should be resolved by looking 
to the date the
specific conflicting rule provision first became effective.
60
There are three problems here. First, it almost 
certainly cannot
be the case that the central inquiry is when 
a provision "first" took
effect. Second, the Advisory Committee ignores 
that the division in
approach among the courts regarding supersession 
reflects the famil-
iar division between those who focus on the plain 
language of the text
and those who rely on the lawmakers' purpose. 
Finally, the proposed
solution to the supersession problem may not 
have much traction with
a judge who emphasizes the plain language of a text.
The Advisory Committee believes that supersession 
issues should
be resolved by looking to the date that the specific 
rule provision first
took effect. But that can't be right. Consider 
a simple example: Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) requires (subject to certain 
excep-
tions) that an answer be filed twenty days after the 
service of a
summons and complaint. Suppose Congress 
were to enact legislation
in 2006 setting the time to answer at ten days. 
And suppose the Advi-
sory Committee were to conclude in 2008 that 
ten days is simply too
short and recommend that Rule 12(a) be repromulgated 
to establish
twenty days as the time to answer. If the 
Supreme Court were to
repromulgate Rule 12(a) for the precise purpose of 
reinstating the
twenty day period (and if Congress had not repealed 
the Supreme
Court's rulemaking authority in this regard), surely 
it should be un-
derstood to supersede the statute. Yet under 
the "first became effec-
tive" standard, the newly repromulgated rule 
would not supersede the
statute because the twenty day period "first 
became effective" well
before the 2006 statute. Indeed, under the 
"first became effective"
58 Supersession and the Style Project (May 8, 2006), in 2006 
REsTmYLD RULES,
supra note 1, at D-229, D-231 to D-232 [hereinafter 
Supersession].
59 2006 RESTrLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-208.
60 Id. at D-209.
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standard, it would be impossible for the Supreme Court to reinstate a
prior rule.61 In this simple example, it could establish a nineteen day
period or a twenty-one day period, but it could not reestablish a
twenty day period.
Of course, it would frequently be unwise and disrespectful for the
Supreme Court to attempt to reimpose a rule that Congress had su-
perseded. However, slight modifications of the simple example can
remove the risk of folly or disrespect.. For example, imagine that the
congressional act was avowedly experimental, or that the statutory
provision involved was a minor aspect of a major bill and the drafters
mistakenly thought that they were replicating what the Federal Rules
already required. In any event, it is difficult to see why the Supreme
Court, under the Rules Enabling Act, should lack the power to rein-
state a rule, even if a given exercise of that power might be
wrongheaded. 62
What the members of the Advisory Committee evidently have in
mind are situations where the purpose of promulgating a rule was not
to reinstate a prior rule, but instead something else, particularly to
make stylistic improvements and clarify meaning. Once it is seen that
the rulemakers might intend to reinstate a prior rule, or might intend
only stylistic changes, it becomes clear that the "first became effective"
standard is not itself an appropriate general principle for deciding
issues of supersession. Instead it is merely an application of a broader
interpretive principle, that "supersession is determined by looking to
the nature and purpose of the amendment."63
At this point we can see the second difficulty with the Advisory
Committee's approach to supersession. By assuming that supersession
turns on the "purpose" of the amendment, it misses that the conflict
in the way cases approach supersession mirrors the conflict in ap-
proaches to interpretation generally. Some judges focus on the text,
not caring what the lawmakers had in mind (if anything64), while
61 One could even go a step further and inquire whether a given Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure that took effect in 1938 actually "first" took effect much earlier, per-
haps with the Equity Rules of 1912.
62 See McConville v. United States, 197 F.2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1952) (Clark, J.)
(holding that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governed, both because the statute
was designed to be in conformity with the Federal Rule and because the Federal Rule
"was reenacted (with some changes not here pertinent)" with an effective date subse-
quent to the statute and, "in accordance with the terms of the governing statute, su-
persedes all inconsistent statutory enactments" (citation omitted)).
63 Supersession, supra note 58, at D-231.
64 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia,., dissenting)
("It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress-who
need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective-
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others seek to determine the lawmakers' purpose. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit did not care about the purpose of the 1998
amendments to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). It found
a textual conflict between an earlier text and a later text and chose
the later text as stating the governing law.65 The Courts of Appeals for
the Second and Tenth Circuits, by contrast, looked to the purpose of
the rule amendments and found no supersession because the purpose
of those amendments was merely stylistic.6 6 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will be construed and administered by judges with both
approaches (and some mixture of each); rulemakers proceed at their
peril if they assume thatjudges will operate from the rulemakers' pre-
ferred interpretive posture.
The Advisory Committee is, of course, aware of these interpretive
disagreements. It has chosen not to rely simply on an Advisory Com-
mittee Note explaining that the purpose of the restyling is not to ef-
fect supersession. Instead, it has included a proposed rule addressing
the issue. But its proposed rule does not explicitly provide a rule for
the construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, it
appears to provide a rule for the construction of the supersession
clause of the Rules Enabling Act:
If any provision in Rules 1-5.1, 6-73, or 77-86 conflicts with another
law, priority in time for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) is not
affected by the amendments taking effect on December 1, 2007.67
A judge who shares the interpretive assumptions of the Advisory
Committee will have little problem with this provision. While at first
blush she may wonder what the rulemakers were thinking, she will
consult the Advisory Committee Note and learn that "[n] one of these
amendments is intended to affect resolution of any conflict that might
arise between a rule and another law."68 She will rely on this purpose
and decide any supersession question that arises from the restyled
rules in the same way she would have decided them before the
restyled rules took effect.
Yet such a judge would not likely need to have a text such as the
proposed Rule 86(b); she would likely be content to rely on Advisory
Committee Notes explaining that the amendments are intended to be
stylistic to conclude that supersession was not affected by the restyled
but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code,
adopted by various Congresses at various times.").
65 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
67 2006 RESTYLED RULES, supra note 1, at D-208.
68 Id. at 209.
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rules. Proposed Rule 86(b) is far more importantly aimed at a textual-
ist judge.
How might a textualist judge respond? Might he not say some-
thing along the following lines:
The statute tells me that all laws in conflict with a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure are "of no further force or effect" after the Rule
has "taken effect." The Rule that I am considering took effect on
December 1, 2007. That's the date set in the Supreme Court's or-
der, a date consistent with the statutory requirement set in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074. So far, it looks like the Rule will trump prior law.
Now, Rule 86(b) tells me that "priority in time for the purpose"
of § 2072(b) is "not affected by the amendments taking effect on
December 1, 2007." But how can that be? Either the text of the
Rule that I am considering took effect on December 1, 2007, or it
didn't. If it took effect on December 1, 2007, the text of the statute
tells me that it trumps prior law. Is Rule 86(b) telling me that the
text of the Rule somehow did not take effect on December 1, 2007?
Or took effect for some purposes but not for others?
Congress in § 2074 gave the Supreme Court a limited power to
"fix the extent" to which a Rule "shall apply to proceedings then
pending," but it didn't give the Supreme Court the power to "fix the
extent" to which a Rule would "take effect" for purposes of
§ 2072(b). Nor did it give the Court the power to promulgate a
Rule establishing "priority in time" for purposes of § 2072(b). A
statute can tell us how to interpret a statute, and a Rule can tell us
how to interpret a Rule, but a Rule can't tell us how to interpret a
statute-unless a statute so provides. If Rules could tell us how to
interpret a statute, then the amendment to § 2072 permitting the
promulgation of Rules to "define when a ruling of a district court is
final for purposes of appeal under § 1291," would have been com-
pletely unnecessary.
So I am back where I started. The Rule, which took effect on
December 1, 2007, trumps prior law.
If the goal is to avoid the risk that a textualist judge will give su-
perseding force to the restyled rules, it seems to me that it would be
better to explicitly provide a rule for the construction of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a rule might provide:
No provision in Rules 1-5.1, 6-73, or 77-86, as amended effective
December 1, 2007, may be construed to conflict with another law in
effect on November 30, 2007.
Or:
All provisions in Rules 1-5.1, 6-73, or 77-86, as amended effective
December 1, 2007, must be construed to be consistent with all other
laws in effect on November 30, 2007.
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Such a provision would instruct a judge that even if his or her
best interpretation of a restyled rule would otherwise be that the
restyled rule conflicted with preexisting law, this is not the correct way
to construe the rule. If the restyled rule is construed so as to produce
no such conflict, there is nothing to trigger supersession. Such a rule
would not attempt to alter or define the meaning of the supersession
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Instead, it would establish the
meaning of the rules themselves.
CONCLUSION
The effort to restyle the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has in-
volved so many talented and hardworking people over such a long
period of time that it is probably impossible to stop it completely. Al-
though I fear that adoption of the restyled rules may make it harder
for more substantial reform to be made-and despair that the restyl-
ing may ultimately stand as the best that this generation accomplished
in procedural reform-my respect for those involved in the process
(and recognition of their well-deserved influence) leads me to refrain
from suggesting that the proposed restyled rules simply be blocked in
their tracks.
Yet if adopted as proposed by the Advisory Committee, there is a
real risk that the restyled rules will be understood to mean something
different than the current rules mean. There is also a real risk that
the restyled rules will engender litigation over whether to adhere to
the current meaning of the current rule in light of the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes or instead to follow the plain language of the restyled
rule. Finally, there is some risk that textualist judges will treat the
restyled rules as superseding prior statutes.
Some may say that these risks have not materialized with the
restyling of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and therefore should be of no concern
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet even assuming that
those restyling projects have been as big a success as their advocates
claim, there are substantial differences between those sets of rules and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only govern proceed-
ings in the courts of appeals. There are far fewer cases in the courts of
appeals than in the district courts. 69 Moreover, the Federal Rules of
69 In 2005, there were 253,273 civil cases filed in United States District Courts,
and 68,473 appeals filed in regional United States Courts of Appeals. See DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbls.2.1 & 4.1, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicia
factsfigures/contents.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
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Civil Procedure are relevant not only in the district courts, but also in
appellate courts reviewing district court decisions. In addition, an ap-
peal generally involves but a single round of briefing, perhaps an oral
argument, and a decision. In a district court, the process of briefing,
argument, and decision is repeated many times in a single case as vari-
ous motions, invoking various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are
made, briefed, argued, and decided over a course of months and
years. There are simply far more opportunities to apply (and there-
fore to dispute the meaning of) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
than the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. This difference is re-
flected in the law school curriculum: far more time is devoted to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. A required course is built around the former, while scant
attention is paid to the latter.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are a closer analogy.
But even so, there are far fewer federal criminal cases than federal
civil cases. 70 A larger proportion of criminal procedure is controlled
by constitutional requirements, as opposed to the Federal Rules, than
is true of civil procedure. This difference, too, is reflected in the law
school curriculum: a course in criminal procedure is largely devoted
to constitutional law of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
compared to a relatively small share devoted to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. A course in civil procedure, by contrast, will typi-
cally spend more time on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than
the constitutional requirements of due process and jury trial. Finally,
for a given number of cases, federal criminal prosecutions will involve
fewer individual lawyers than federal civil cases. One side of the case
will virtually always involve a member of the United States Attorney's
Office, while the other side will frequently involve a member of the
Federal Defender's Office or an attorney on a Criminal Justice Act
panel.7'
Thus, there is substantial reason to hesitate before concluding
that restyled Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be as successful as
restyled Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,
70 In 2005, there were 253,273 civil cases and 69,575 criminal cases filed in
United States District Courts. See id. tbls.2.1 & 5.1.
71 See CAROLINE WOLF IARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
dccc.pdf (reporting that thirty percent of accused felons were represented by a Fed-
eral Defender Organization and thirty-six percent were represented by a panel attor-
ney, leaving approximately one-third represented by private counsel).
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In light of these risks, I suggest that the proposed restyled rules
be remanded to the Advisory Committee. Now that the Advisory
Committee has produced the clearest restatement of the current rules
that it could, let us acknowledge frankly that these rules may, despite
the Advisory Committee's best efforts, mean something different than
the current rules and ask directly whether these proposed restyled
rules are good rules. Having done the best it could to mirror the
meaning of the existing rules in clearer language, I suggest that the
Advisory Committee put that task behind it and look at the proposed
restyled rules with fresh eyes and a fresh question: Should these rules
be adopted on their own merit?
This is not a call for utopianism; I do not suggest that the Advi-
sory Committee ask whether these are the best rules imaginable, but
rather whether these are the best rules that can realistically be ex-
pected at this time and place. If the answer is no, the rules should not
be adopted. If the answer is yes, they should clearly displace the cur-
rent rules, rather than leave open for argument the contention that
they must be construed to carry forward the meaning of existing rules.
Indeed, if the answer is yes, the possibility of embracing supersession
rather than awkwardly seeking to avoid it-with particular exceptions
for particular statutes where appropriate-should be considered.
And until the question whether these rules should be adopted on
their own merit is asked and answered, the proposed restyled rules
should not go into effect.
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